We checked the 1,000 most-visited websites: only 13% get four basics right
Jaime Guerrero · · 7 min read
On October 7, 2026 I ran CertiMonitor's checks against the 1,000 websites people visit most, according to Google's Chrome UX Report. Those 1,000 addresses belong to 822 distinct domains. For each one I looked at four things:
- the certificate the site serves,
- the domain's registration at its registry,
- its email authentication records,
- its CAA record.
Each of the four basics is common on its own. Having all four is rare. Among the 627 domains where every check returned data, only 82, or 13%, had all of these:
- a certificate browsers trust,
- a DMARC policy that actually blocks spoofed mail (
quarantineorreject), - the transfer lock on at the registrar,
- a CAA record limiting which certificate authorities may issue for the domain.
The details are below, with the method and its limits at the end. The full per-domain dataset is free to download.
Email: almost a quarter of top sites can be spoofed freely
| Of 813 domains whose DNS answered | Domains | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Publish an SPF record | 612 | 75.3% |
| Publish a DMARC record | 545 | 67.0% |
DMARC policy that blocks spoofing (quarantine or reject) | 397 | 48.8% |
DMARC set to p=none, monitoring only | 147 | 18.1% |
| Neither SPF nor DMARC | 187 | 23.0% |
Fewer than half of the most-visited websites on the internet tell receiving mail servers to reject or quarantine mail that falsely claims to come from them. For the 187 domains with neither record, nothing in DNS stops anyone from sending mail with a From address on that domain. Spam filters may still catch it, but the domain owner has given them nothing to work with.
p=none is the most common unfinished state. More than a quarter of DMARC records stop there: the domain gets reports about spoofing but asks receivers to deliver the mail anyway. I wrote about why p=none doesn't stop spoofing and how to move past it.
The details of the records that do exist:
- SPF catch-alls: 54.2% end with
~all(softfail, "suspicious but deliver"), 42.0% with the strict-all, and 1.3% with?all, which tells receivers nothing. - DMARC reporting: 84.4% of DMARC records ask for aggregate reports (
rua=). - The 2026 revision: 13 domains still use
pct=below 100 to roll out gradually. That tag was removed in May 2026 by RFC 9989 and replaced with at=ytest flag, which none of these domains use yet. More on the revision in how SPF, DKIM and DMARC actually decide. - MTA-STS, which makes mail to the domain arrive encrypted, is almost absent. 22 domains publish it, and only 8 enforce it.
DKIM is harder to measure from the outside, because keys live under selector names each provider chooses. Checking 20 common selectors found a key for 47.6% of domains. The real number is certainly higher.
Certificates: every site valid, most on 90-day automation
800 domains completed a TLS handshake on the address people visit. Of the rest, 6 had no reachable host and 16 failed to connect or timed out. Every one of the 800 served a certificate that browsers trust: no expired certificates, no missing intermediates, no name mismatches. At this level of traffic, certificates are a solved problem in the moment. The question is how they're renewed.
Who issues them. Free, automated certificate authorities now issue most of them:
| Certificate authority | Share of certificates |
|---|---|
| Google Trust Services | 36.0% |
| Let's Encrypt | 18.6% |
| DigiCert | 16.5% |
| Amazon | 9.3% |
| GlobalSign | 6.4% |
| Sectigo | 6.1% |
Google, Let's Encrypt and Amazon, which all issue at no cost through automation, account for 63.9%. Much of Google's share likely comes from CDNs and hosting platforms, such as Cloudflare, that issue certificates through it on their customers' behalf.
How long they last. Since March 15, 2026, a public certificate can be valid for at most 200 days (the schedule):
| Lifetime | Certificates |
|---|---|
| 47 days or less | 7 |
| 48 to 100 days | 450 |
| 101 to 200 days | 219 |
| Over 200 days | 124 |
The median certificate lasts 90 days, the standard lifetime of automated CAs. All 124 certificates longer than 200 days were issued before the cap took effect, and will cycle out by early 2027.
In March 2027 the cap drops to 100 days. 343 of these 800 certificates were issued for longer than that, so those setups will have to renew at least twice as often. For anyone renewing by hand today, that's the deadline to automate.
Keys and protocols.
- Keys: ECDSA has overtaken RSA. 52.2% of certificates use an elliptic-curve key, mostly P-256, against 44.8% for RSA 2048.
- Protocol: TLS 1.3 was negotiated with 91.4% of sites. The other 8.6% only offered TLS 1.2.
Domains: locked, rarely signed
635 domains returned registration data over RDAP. Most of the other 187 are country-code domains (.jp, .de, .ru, .it and others) whose registries don't offer RDAP, so they're not in these figures.
| Of 635 domains with registry data | Domains | Share |
|---|---|---|
Transfer lock on (clientTransferProhibited) | 524 | 82.5% |
Registry lock (any server…Prohibited status) | 104 | 16.4% |
| DNSSEC enabled (of 619 that report it) | 59 | 9.5% |
| Expiring within 90 days | 58 | 9.1% |
The transfer lock is common but not universal: about one in six popular sites could be moved to another registrar without first unlocking the domain. Registry lock, the stronger protection where changes need manual verification at the registry, covers one in six. DNSSEC, which protects DNS answers from being forged in transit, is on for fewer than one in ten. It adds an operational risk many teams decide isn't worth it, as I described in the domain registration lifecycle.
The registrars are more varied than you might expect for the biggest sites. Namecheap holds the most at 13.4%, ahead of MarkMonitor (8.7%), a registrar that serves large brands, and GoDaddy (7.2%).
CAA: four in five don't restrict who can issue
Only 170 domains (20.8% of 819) publish a CAA record. Without one, any public certificate authority may issue a certificate for the domain, as long as whoever asks passes domain validation.
Domains that publish CAA typically allow 4 CAs. DigiCert appears in 78% of those lists, Let's Encrypt in 65%, Sectigo in 54% and Google in 52%. 98 of them set a separate rule for wildcard certificates (issuewild), and 46 give CAs a contact for blocked requests (iodef).
What I'd take from this
Most of these gaps are cheap to close and stay closed once fixed:
- Publish SPF and DMARC on every domain you own, including the ones that never send mail. For those,
v=spf1 -allandv=DMARC1; p=rejecttake two minutes. - Move DMARC from
p=noneto enforcement. Almost one in five of these sites has started and stopped there. - Add a CAA record listing the CAs you actually use.
- Check that renewals can keep up with 100-day certificates in March 2027, especially anything not renewed through ACME today.
Method
- Websites: the 1,000 origins in the top rank bucket of the Chrome UX Report (CrUX) global list for August 2026, published in September and taken from the public crux-top-lists snapshot. CrUX ranks by real Chrome visits, but doesn't order sites within a bucket, so this report doesn't rank sites against each other.
- Domains: the origins come down to 822 registrable domains (
m.example.comandwww.example.comcount once), using the Public Suffix List. - Why CrUX: I first ran the study on the Tranco list, which blends DNS-traffic rankings. Its top 1,000 is full of CDN and infrastructure domains and legacy redirect names, so I switched to CrUX, which reflects websites people actually open.
- When: October 7, 2026, between 15:23 and 15:27 UTC, from a single vantage point. Lookups that failed for reasons that might be temporary were retried once.
- TLS: a TLS connection to port 443 on the host people visit, the
www.or bare origin when listed, validated against Node.js's built-in trust store, which follows Mozilla's. - Registration: the registry's RDAP service, located through IANA's bootstrap list.
- DNS: SPF, DMARC, 20 common DKIM selectors, MTA-STS and CAA, queried through Cloudflare's and Google's public resolvers.
- Limits:
- CrUX only covers Chrome users who share usage statistics.
- Domains whose registry offers no RDAP are excluded from the registration and four-basics figures.
- DKIM is undercounted.
- Results come from one location at one point in time.
- No individual site is named in this article.
The code is the same that runs CertiMonitor's free check, plus collectors for CAA, MTA-STS and DNSSEC.
Download the data
The per-domain results are free to use with attribution (CC BY 4.0): domain-security-crux-top1000.csv. Each row has the domain, the host checked, certificate status, issuer, lifetime, key and protocol, registration facts, SPF and DMARC policy, DKIM selectors found, MTA-STS mode and CAA issuers.
Some of these sites are not safe for work
The list is what Chrome users visit most, unfiltered, so the dataset includes adult, gambling and piracy sites, and some that serve aggressive ads or worse. Be careful opening domains from it, and avoid doing so on a work device. To look one up safely, enter it in the free check instead of visiting it: the check only reads public certificate, registry and DNS records.
To see where your own domain stands on all of these: